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OVER UNDER OR THROUGH: 
PHYSICIANS, LAW, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 
WILLIAM M. SAGE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Physicians are law-abiding citizens.  Sometimes, however, the medical 
profession accuses the law itself of wrongdoing.  Two years ago, for example, 
the editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Jeffrey M. 
Drazen, published an editorial called “Government in Medicine.”1  In it, he 
expressed unhappiness that the Supreme Court had upheld Congress’s partial 
birth abortion ban, and he criticized Congress’s earlier attempt to intervene in 
Terri Schiavo’s medical care.  I agree with him on both of these specific issues.  
But then he went farther, asserting that “the judicial branch has regrettably 
joined the legislative branch in practicing medicine without a license,” and 
arguing sweepingly that “[g]overnment regulation has no place in 
[medicine].”2 
The superficial irony, of course, is that none other than government 
requires, defines, and supplies medical licenses.  For a physician to want 
regulation out of medical licensing is as absurd as the oft-quoted saw about a 
senior citizen telling his congressman to “keep the government out of my 
Medicare.”3  Legal restriction and coercion are pervasive in American health 
 
* Vice Provost for Health Affairs and James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence in Law, 
The University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 2195. 
 3. For an even blunter statement of this point, consider economist Uwe Reinhardt’s 
response to a physician writing in support of libertarian law professor Richard Epstein (himself 
no great friend of medical licensing) during Epstein’s exchange with Reinhardt over the 
desirability of government-mandated health insurance for the poor in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association (JAMA): 
[Dr. James F.] Lally writes of “a fierce sense of rugged individualism, independence, and 
self-reliance that have been and still are the hallmarks of the American ethos.”  Where are 
these rugged individualists? . . .  Would I find them in the medical profession, whose 
members rely so heavily on public subsidies for their education and the science they 
apply, who now seek a federal tax preference for medical savings accounts, who plead 
with government to punish managed care organizations that are late in paying bills, to 
impose on managed care organizations any-willing-provider laws, and to regulate 
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care, often determining what is offered to patients, who provides it, and who 
pays for it.  Political control of health care regulation varies considerably, as 
does the level of specificity at which that regulation operates.  Still, the 
physician-editor’s comment reveals a basic truth. Even—or perhaps 
especially—in today’s complex and expensive health care system, the 
American medical profession continues to regard law with unease and 
mistrust.4 
The sources of discomfiture are multiple and varied, with deep historical 
roots.  Substantial amounts of Paul Starr’s classic work, The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine, chronicle physicians’ many (usually 
successful) attempts over the past 250 years to use legal authority to suppress 
professional rivals and fend off corporate influences while simultaneously 
keeping legal authority from exerting unwanted control over them.5  In earlier 
work, I ascribed the current “lawyerization” of the medical profession 
principally to four relatively recent encounters between medicine and law: 
medical malpractice, bioethics, federal health entitlement programs, and the 
managed care onslaught and backlash.6 
Unsurprisingly, a love-hate relationship of this duration and intensity 
defies easy explanation.  The history of medicine’s attitudes toward law is not 
unidirectional, and neither is the “law” involved in American health care 
monolithic.  Federal law and state law, for example, have different sources of 
authority, scopes of influence, and styles of application.  As the New England 
Journal of Medicine editor observed, physicians are subject to both statutory 
law and judge-made law,7 to which one might add executive-branch 
administrative law as also capable of “practicing medicine.”  Regulatory 
oversight, moreover, is quite unlike civil litigation as an enforcement regime.  
The admixture of regulation and litigation is a striking aspect of health system 
governance in the United States, which in other work I have discussed as 
reflecting incomplete conceptual commitments to consumer sovereignty, 
 
managed care organizations with countless other strictures, and who have never balked at 
using archaic licensure laws to protect their own economic turf? . . .  As all of these self-
styled, rugged individualists enlist their government’s coercive power to protect their own 
fiscal health, they might more gracefully countenance the use of that power and also 
protect the physical health of poor children and, indeed, of all poor people. 
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Letter to the Editor, Articulating a Social Ethic for Health Care, 279 JAMA 
745, 746 (1998). 
 4. See Drazen, supra note 1. 
 5. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
 6. William M. Sage, The Lawyerization of Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1179 
(2001). 
 7. Drazen, supra note 1, at 2195. 
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industrial efficiency, and social solidarity where health care is concerned.8  
Finally, much of what passes for law in health care is quasi-legal at best, 
consisting of delegated authority, structured self-regulation, and professional 
norms. 
In her Childress Lecture, Professor Sandra Johnson explores physicians’ 
accusations against legal governance.9  She focuses on allegations regarding 
“bad law,” which she defines as law that harms patients.10  To her credit, she 
examines these controversies with an open mind, looking for principled 
objections and not merely contextual resistance to legal measures that threaten 
physicians’ collective economic self-interest.  The moment seems right for 
such an approach.  Scholarship on the professions has followed an intellectual 
pendulum from an altruistic extreme in the Talcott Parsons era to a 
protectionist extreme in the Eliot Freidson era.11  It now seems to be swinging 
back again, offering hope that “professionalism” can be understood as more 
than an empty vessel.  Still, the New England Journal of Medicine editor’s 
over-generalization suggests that physicians might well choose “no law” over 
“good law” as a solution to imperfect law. 
My purpose in this commentary is twofold.  First, I want to offer a few 
thoughts on why the American medical profession sometimes has a hard time 
accepting law on its own terms.  Second, I want to suggest that even “good 
law” from the perspective of the medical profession—should it overcome its 
habits of resistance—may still be bad health policy for the United States. 
Under President Barack Obama, Washington, D.C. is asserting a 
progressive interest in health care reform for the first time in over fifteen years.  
Accordingly, I choose as metaphor for my comments a famous anecdote from 
the life of another young, progressive (though Republican) President.  Teddy 
Roosevelt and his children used to go on character-building outings, which 
they called “scrambles,” in Washington’s Rock Creek Park.  Whenever they 
encountered an obstacle, the rule was that they could go over it, they could go 
under it, or they could go through it.  But they could never go around it; they 
could never take the easy way. 
 
 8. See William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health Care 
Regulation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 387 (2003). 
 9. Sandra H. Johnson, Professor Emerita of Law & Health Care Ethics at Saint Louis 
University School of Law, Keynote Address at Saint Louis University Law Journal Richard J. 
Childress Memorial Lecture: Still Crazy After All These Years: Is Regulating Physician Practice 
an Exercise in Futility? (Oct. 17, 2008), in Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: 
Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009). 
 10. Johnson, supra note 9, at 974–76. 
 11. Compare TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951), with ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1986). 
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Analogously, physicians do not always deal with law in the easiest way, 
which is to comply with it.  Instead, one can divide physicians’ contentious 
interactions with law into three categories.  Sometimes, physicians leap over 
the law, regarding it as superfluous.  Other times, physicians squeeze under the 
law, regarding it as oppressive.  Finally, there are times when physicians plow 
through the law, regarding it merely as a manifestation of political power. 
This essay begins with some generalizations about why physicians seem ill 
at ease with law and lawyers.  It then offers a few examples of “over under or 
through” phenomena.  Finally, it returns to Dr. Drazen’s complaint, and 
suggests that the most important source of tension between law and physicians 
is not that law improperly devalues physicians’ expertise, but that law accedes 
too readily to physicians’ declared (and ethically defensible) allegiance to each 
individual patient, and does not demand greater service to society as a whole. 
I hope that the points I will make about the medical profession seem 
accurate, and that they prove relevant to the current health reform debate.  
However, as I am sure Professor Johnson would agree, they are certainly not 
“eternal truths.”  Professions are composed of people, and as the people change 
the professions change as well.  The medical profession is growing relatively 
slowly, so that it takes many years for newer physicians to replace established 
ones.  And law has acted more as a brake on professional change than as an 
accelerator.  Nonetheless, it would be misleading to suggest that modal 
behaviors of doctors (or lawyers) at any moment in time constitute immutable 
characteristics of their profession.  Therefore, one should expect the medical 
profession to alter its collective mindset—including its orientation to law—as 
both its constituent membership and its surrounding environment evolve. 
I.  PHYSICIANS AND THE LAW 
Why might doctors be uncomfortable with law?  I studied both medicine 
and law, and have practiced each profession.  As several commentators have 
observed, there are indeed different professional traditions involved.12  
Lawyers are accustomed to adversarial posturing, with final recourse to an 
impartial but inexpert decision-maker.  Doctors prefer consensus, and are only 
deferential to professional seniority and clinical experience.  Lawyers are at 
ease with applying rules; doctors are more used to assuming roles.  When a 
medical student dons a white coat or swears the Hippocratic Oath, he or she 
acquires a mental image of what a physician is and does.  Lawyers do not form 
their professional identities at such an early point in their collective education, 
 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel M. Fox, Physicians Versus Lawyers: A Conflict of Cultures, in AIDS 
AND THE LAW 210 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987); Peter D. Jacobson & M. Gregg Bloche, 
Improving Relations Between Attorneys and Physicians, 294 JAMA 2083 (2005); Sage, supra 
note 6. 
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and they see themselves performing a much wider range of tasks subject to an 
equally wide range of constraints. 
One result of physicians’ unshakeable self-image and gestalt sense of their 
work is that they guess in situations where lawyers would “look it up.”  
Physicians guess with the best of intentions and from the greatest wealth of 
experience that they can bring to bear, but they guess nonetheless.  New 
information technologies such as personal data assistants and decision support 
software are narrowing the gap, but the core difference in approach remains. 
Professor Johnson also notes that physicians lack affection for procedure, 
which is an essential characteristic of a functioning legal system.13  She is 
correct that doctors generally want to get quickly to the right result, while 
lawyers are more interested in following the process set out to reach that result.  
Habit-driven self-interest may reinforce both positions: doctors’ lucrative 
piecework consists of tests and procedures, while lawyers’ consists of hours 
billed during protracted litigation.  More deeply, however, lawyers understand 
that fairness depends on procedural integrity, while doctors see themselves as 
individually providing fairness as well as expertise.  The medical profession 
assumes it knows what patients want—better health at any price—and seldom 
recognizes that services provided to one patient influence services available to 
others.  By contrast, the legal profession often needs guidance from clients as 
to the desired goals (lawyers get off track ethically, for example, when they 
come to believe that all clients want is more money), and it is inevitable that 
wins for some clients often imply losses for others.  Consequently, lawyers see 
fair process as furthering their work rather than impeding it, and they are more 
tolerant of it. 
Some of physicians’ apparent resistance to law stems less from law itself 
than from a perceived change in the source of law.  Health law teachers often 
introduce law students to the field by identifying “paradigms” that help explain 
the law’s trends and tensions.14  Among these is the “professional paradigm,” 
meaning legal deference to the judgment of the medical profession, as 
contrasted with furtherance of contractual freedom, social welfare, or personal 
autonomy.15  In fact, much of what one thinks of as health law has really been 
the medical profession’s self-regulatory apparatus.  Physicians have controlled, 
directly or indirectly, virtually everything required to practice medicine, 
including medical education, specialty certification, professional licensing, 
hospital privileges, and liability insurance.  Even the legal determination of 
medical malpractice is based on a deviation from professional norms as 
 
 13. Johnson, supra note 9, at 992. 
 14. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical 
Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 (1994); 
Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004). 
 15. Blumstein, supra note 14, at 1463–67. 
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evidenced by the testimony of physician experts.  In addition to the deference 
accorded physicians to decide how medicine should be governed, physicians 
are often empowered to make judgments that are partly social, such as 
eligibility for disability compensation or other social services.  Attempts by 
non-physicians to withdraw these privileges, or to flex legal muscle 
themselves, are naturally resented. 
A paradox of medical care in the United States is that its enormous social 
expense—over $2 trillion annually16—has not resulted in the organization of 
physicians and other service providers into industrially efficient delivery 
systems.  A large number of physicians still practice individually or in very 
small groups.17  Fragmentation of medical practice is not only a source of 
inefficiency in the U.S. health care system, but it is also a partial explanation 
for why the relationship between physicians and the law is contentious.  
Combine fragmented medical practice with financial prosperity, local 
prominence, and high self-esteem—a reasonable description of American 
medicine for the past fifty years—and interactions between physicians and law 
becomes personal as well as professional.  The U.S. health care system, which 
one can think of as the world’s most expensive cottage industry, has bred a lot 
of big fish in a lot of small ponds. 
For example, physicians often see legal entanglements as affronts to 
personal privacy or professional reputation, and respond accordingly—
especially when they believe they are acting in the public interest rather than 
their own.  Professor Johnson mentions physicians’ dislike of Big Brother-ish 
triplicate reporting systems for controlled substances.18  I would add almost 
anything having to do with medical malpractice.19  For example, I have long 
supported abolishing the malpractice component of the National Practitioner 
Data Bank (NPDB) because it discourages physicians from disclosing adverse 
events to patients and settling claims.20 
 
 16. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2007: Slower Drug Spending 
Contributes to Lowest Rate of Overall Growth Since 1998, 28 HEALTH AFF. 246, 246 (2009). 
 17. See Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Benefits of and Barriers to Large Medical Group 
Practice in the United States, 163 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1958 (2003). 
 18. Johnson, supra note 9, at 1027–29, 1027 n.267. 
 19. See generally William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, 
in ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004) 
(“[A] malpractice suit is a genuinely felt professional insult—an assault on both physicians’ self-
esteem and their esteem by others.”). 
 20. See, e.g., William M. Sage et al., Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic 
Information Policy for Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1300 
(2006) (explaining the rationale for repeal of the NPDB malpractice reporting requirement); see 
also Martin J. Hatlie & Susan E. Sheridan, The Medical Liability Crisis of 2003: Must We 
Squander the Chance to Put Patients First?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 37, 39 (2003) (urging, among other 
things, repeal of the NPDB as part of comprehensive medical liability reform). 
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Cash flow is another aspect of atomistic medical practice that influences 
how physicians relate to law.  As U.S. Representative Jim Cooper observes, 
physicians’ practices are America’s most undercapitalized businesses.21  
Doctors use expensive collective resources, such as hospitals, without making 
capital investments in them; collect as revenue only a small fraction of what 
they cause to be spent on overall patient care; and expect that almost all of that 
revenue (net of current operating expenses) will be taken as personal 
compensation.  They respond readily to even minor cash incentives22—as do 
many small businesspeople—and tend to defer many non–urgent practice 
expenditures.  As a result, they often engage law reactively, rather than 
viewing legal services and regulatory compliance as an ongoing aspect of 
doing business. 
A role-driven common professional identity coupled with individual 
under-investment in the practice environment promotes herd behavior when it 
comes to legal governance.  It is relatively easy, for example, to engage 
physicians collectively in efforts to reform the law, and even to co-opt 
physicians in order to benefit other political interests.  Professor Johnson 
alludes to this in her article.  During the most recent medical malpractice crisis, 
for example, business groups seeking to curtail personal injury litigation 
generally used physicians as poster children for tort reform.23  Organized 
medicine never realized that its chance of obtaining customized relief from 
malpractice insurance costs was undercut by this more sweeping political 
strategy.  Grassroots physicians saw only a familiar enemy—in this case, trial 
lawyers, though it could as easily have been insurance companies or “big 
government”—and mobilized without hesitation. 
II.  “OVER”: LAW AS IRRELEVANCE 
Physicians routinely disregard certain laws that strike them as incompatible 
with their professional identity and traditions.  Consider federal antitrust law, 
which asserts that sellers should act independently of one another, and that 
buyers not sellers should set the terms of trade.  This seems unnatural to 
 
 21. See Jim Cooper, Commentary, Fresh Thinking Response, FRESH-THINKING, Nov. 25, 
2007, at 10, http://www.fresh-thinking.org/docs/workshop_071129/Commentary_Cooper_on_ 
Jost.pdf (responding to Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Legal and Regulatory Issues Presented by Health 
Care Reform, FRESH-THINKING, Nov. 29–30, 2007, http://www.fresh-thinking.org/docs/ 
workshop_071129/Paper_T_ Jost.pdf). 
 22. See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral 
Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009) (discussing how and why physician 
decisionmaking does, or does not, conform to traditional behavioral economic theories). 
 23. See CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL LAWYERS, INC.: A REPORT ON 
THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 12 (2003), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/ 
pdf/triallawyersinc.pdf; see also Postings of Bill Sage & James R. Copland, to PointofLaw.com, 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/condition_critical1205.php (Nov.–Dec. 2005). 
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physicians, who prefer to decide jointly as professional colleagues who is (and 
who is not) worthy of treating patients, to plan the range of services that will 
be available in their community, and to set the conditions under which those 
services will be delivered. 
Sometimes the law explicitly permits these behaviors, but sometimes it 
does not.  Yet some physicians continue to believe that their small businesses 
are entitled to act anti-competitively.  They band together to fix fees billed to 
private health insurers, reasoning that the insurers are big and they are small.24  
They question medical staff privileges for newcomers, reasoning that their 
communities have enough physician specialists already.25  If they come to 
believe that medical practice should change, they change it by group assent, 
not commercial innovation.  They file many antitrust claims themselves, 
usually against hospitals that are dealing more favorably with other physicians, 
but are often unclear on the theory of the law and succeed only rarely.26  In one 
topsy-turvy case, a surgeon sued his local hospital for keeping competing 
surgeons out, on the theory that the hospital was making him work harder (and 
earn more money) than he wanted to.27  Other lawsuits—disappointingly 
many—reflect personal animosity rather than cognizable legal injury.28 
Another illustration of jumping over the law comes from medical 
education.29  Working hours for medical interns and residents have been 
 
 24. See, e.g., Mesa County Physicians Indep. Practice Ass’n, 127 F.T.C. 564 (1999), 1999 
FTC LEXIS 67 (prohibiting a contracting organization from negotiating collectively on behalf of 
85% of independent physicians in a single geographic area). 
 25. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (upholding treble damage judgment 
against physicians in an Oregon town who revoked hospital privileges of a recently arrived 
surgeon after he decided to establish his own practice instead of being employed by the existing 
surgeon group). 
 26. In one detailed study, physicians in solo or small-group practice constituted 53% of 
private health care antitrust plaintiffs; suits by physicians against hospitals represented 45% of the 
overall sample.  Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the 
Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 566, 575 (2002). 
 27. Patton v. E. Idaho Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 92-36805, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3192, at *3–4 
(9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1994). 
 28. See, e.g., Wright v. S. Mono Hosp. Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1986) 
(describing verbal threats against a physician, his spouse, and his unborn child, followed by a 
fistfight in a radiology suite). 
 29. The two examples are connected.  Antitrust litigation commenced a few years ago 
against the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) alleging that, by prohibiting 
individual negotiation between applicants and teaching hospitals, the NRMP facilitated collusion 
among residency training programs on salaries paid to residents.  See Frances H. Miller & 
Thomas L. Greaney, The National Resident Matching Program and Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 
913, 913 (2003).  Under political pressure from academic medical centers, Congress granted the 
NRMP (which does provide an efficient means of hiring residents and assuring continuity of 
patient care) an antitrust exemption, effectively ending the litigation.  See Pension Funding 
Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596, 611 (codified as amended at 15 
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regulated for almost twenty years, but these laws have been ignored by both 
trainers and trainees.30  The rhythm, content, and duration of medical training 
is a product of two professionally controlled processes: a centralized set of 
accreditation standards and review activities conducted by educational leaders, 
and a decentralized set of workplace decisions made by department chairs, 
attending physicians, and residents themselves.  The former group seemed 
immune from government compulsion but proved susceptible to financial 
pressure—to be specific, threatened suspension of Medicare graduate medical 
education (GME) payments if standards were not adopted and enforced.  The 
latter decision-makers do whatever they consider “appropriate,” which is 
usually determined by personal experience, expectations, and paths of least 
resistance. 
Nonetheless, regulation has improved residents’ working conditions, with 
potential long-term benefits for patient safety, physician welfare, and 
organizational efficiency.31  It has done so, however, by a serpentine path that 
emphasizes the expressive rather than the coercive power of law.  In the 1980s, 
a patient’s unexpected death at a prestigious hospital because of an error by 
overworked, under-supervised trainees typically triggered a predictable course 
of events.  First, an academic discussion of the clinical aspects of the case 
would be held at a department-run “M&M” (morbidity and mortality) 
conference.32  Second, the department chair would dress down the residents at 
fault, making sure their classmates heard about it, but would not screen the 
training environment for safety hazards.33  Third, in the unlikely event the 
patient’s family somehow learned of the error, the hospital would quietly agree 
to a tort settlement with an iron-clad confidentiality clause.34 
Because her father was a prominent journalist and attorney, 18 year-old 
Libby Zion’s death in 1984 at New York Hospital after residents ignored 
obvious symptoms of a severe drug interaction followed a strikingly different 
 
U.S.C. § 37(b) (2006)).  During its pendency, however, the residency programs tried to solve the 
problem of overworked, underpaid residents by agreeing collectively to limit residents’ hours.  
See Bridget Kuehn, IOM: Shorten Residents’ Work Shifts to Reduce Fatigue, Improve Patients’ 
Safety, 301 JAMA 259, 259 (2009).  A clearer indication that competition remained an alien 
concept in academic medicine would be hard to find. 
 30. Kuehn, supra note 29, at 259. 
 31. See INST. OF MED., RESIDENT DUTY HOURS: ENHANCING SLEEP, SUPERVISION, AND 
SAFETY (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter IOM, RESIDENT DUTY HOURS], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12508#toc. 
 32. See ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT 
SCIENCE 58–62 (2002) (describing an M&M conference at Harvard). 
 33. See generally CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL 
FAILURE (1979) (observing and analyzing responses to error in surgical training programs). 
 34. See Hatlie & Sheridan, supra note 20, at 38–39 (explaining how confidentiality clauses 
prevent both injured patients and safety researchers from realizing that others have suffered 
similar injuries). 
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course.35  First, the Manhattan District Attorney convened a criminal grand 
jury, which figuratively indicted the existing system of resident training rather 
than literally indicting the individuals involved.36  Second, the Commissioner 
of New York’s Department of Health appointed a blue ribbon commission, 
chaired by a prominent physician, which issued a report agreeing with the 
grand jury’s assessment of residency training.37  Third, the state legislature 
enacted a statute limiting residents’ hours and requiring closer supervision.38 
The effect of the statute?  Negligible.  Residents, particularly in surgical 
programs, continued to work far longer than the law allowed.  Why?  Likely 
because of a combination of hospital budgets, union contracts, scheduling 
snafus, and professional norms.  The New York experience did, however, 
trigger a national debate, set in motion self-regulatory decisions (conducted in 
the shadow of federal regulatory authority to curtail funding), and inspire 
support for scientific research on patient safety to validate restrictions in 
professional terms.39  In December 2008—twenty-four years after Libby 
Zion’s death—the Institute of Medicine released a comprehensive report on 
residents’ hours recommending further restrictions.40  Medical training 
ultimately was altered by a process of professional evolution—including the 
abuses and errors recalled by today’s professional leaders and the more 
structured employment expectations of today’s graduates—but far more slowly 
and variably than would be the case if physicians simply allowed law to be 
adopted and then complied with it. 
An additional irony is that many physicians seem not to recognize what 
has actually happened to change residency training.  One of the funniest 
moments of my teaching career occurred shortly after the Accreditation 
Council on Graduate Medical Education adopted self-regulatory restrictions on 
residents’ hours in 2003.  A group of surgical residents at New York-
Presbyterian Medical Center showed up at my office, knowing only that I was 
Columbia Law School’s health law expert.  They told me they did not like 
having their hours limited, and asked me point blank “who they could sue.”  
After a few minutes, it became clear not only that they had mistaken 
professional self-regulation for externally imposed law, but also that their gripe 
was with their own hospital’s administration, which chose to make its trainees 
 
 35. See David A. Asch & Ruth M. Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two 
Steps Backward?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 771 (1988). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 773. 
 38. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10 § 405.4 (2008). 
 39. See Robert Steinbrook, The Debate over Residents’ Work Hours, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1296 (2002) (describing events and the debate leading up to the adoption of accreditation 
standards); Harry H. Yoon, Adapting to Duty-Hour Limits Four Years On, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2668 (2007) (explaining how residency programs have accommodated self-regulation). 
 40. See IOM, RESIDENT DUTY HOURS, supra note 31. 
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punch a clock in what seemed both a degrading and an ineffective manner.  
Explaining gently that the enemy was them, I sent the residents back to their 
program director to discuss a better approach to compliance. 
III.  “UNDER”: LAW AS OPPRESSION 
In addition to leaping over laws as if untouched by them, physicians 
expend considerable effort squeezing under laws, and feeling the weight crush 
and oppress them.  In this situation, they fight law hard, and may injure 
themselves further by doing so.  Two examples of perceived laws of 
oppression are medical malpractice liability and federal prohibitions on fraud 
and abuse. 
Medical malpractice has a history and meaning to physicians too complex 
to explain in a short commentary.41  Still, a few aspects bear mention.  
Physicians significantly overestimate the likelihood of a malpractice judgment 
against them, and emotionally conflate a civil claim for compensation with an 
accusation of moral turpitude.42  Why?  Stories and rumors of cases against 
colleagues spread quickly through communities—often as professional 
sympathy, occasionally as malicious gossip.  Plaintiffs are current and former 
patients who seem to be betraying their doctors by accusing those doctors of 
mistreating them.  Lawyers’ contingency fees strike physicians as converting 
tragic misfortune into financial gain, and lawyers’ aggressive advocacy as 
devoid of judgment or restraint.  Cases seem to go on forever, constantly 
hanging over physicians’ heads like the Sword of Damocles.  And, every year, 
large amounts of cash are extracted from physicians’ small businesses to pay 
for malpractice insurance, with sudden, seemingly random increases in cost or 
decreases in availability. 
As a result, hatred of malpractice law and support for “tort reform” is a 
sustaining issue for all sorts of physician groups, whether social gatherings and 
medical staff meetings or county, state, and national medical societies.  
However, gains in this endless fight have been incomplete or transitory, as the 
effects of hard-won legislative battles are undone by courts, eroded by 
subsequent lawmaking, strangled by tight insurance markets, or undercut by 
the emotional impact of an actual claim.  At the same time, comprehensive 
efforts to remedy the root causes of a malfunctioning malpractice system—
most involving better injury prevention, fair compensation for injury, and 
 
 41. See generally MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (William 
M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). 
 42. For a discussion of the difference between malpractice perception and malpractice 
reality, see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68–92 (2005), and FRANK A. 
SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 51–83 (2008). 
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improved liability insurance—attract little support from the medical 
profession.43 
Fraud and abuse liability has acquired a similar mystique, but with a 
different narrative of oppression.  Instead of personal betrayal and rapacious 
lawyering, most fraud claims (qui tam suits aside) are seen as an assault on 
entrepreneurial liberty and hard work by an authoritarian state.  The edifice of 
federal anti-fraud enforcement has been built out haphazardly over time to 
cope with the fiscal disaster of a Medicare program that, for political 
expediency, was designed with perverse incentives and few financial 
safeguards.44  Physicians regard federal fraud enforcers as akin to the Internal 
Revenue Service: imposing arcane bureaucracy, randomly singling out putative 
wrongdoers, and mercilessly driving the accused into financial ruin.45 
Again, physicians tend to view fraud control from a small business 
perspective—unlike the massive supplier enterprises (e.g., pharmaceuticals or 
for-profit hospitals) that attract the majority of attention from government 
fraud auditors—and excuse their own failures of documentation and their 
overly optimistic billing practices as necessary and forgivable adaptations to 
excessive administrative burdens.  It does not help that, as with tax shelters and 
tax compliance for the well-to-do, there are legions of advisors and consultants 
offering physicians easy money deals and fancy billing methods, which 
simultaneously enhance the risk of fraud and increase resentment of fraud 
enforcement. 
The government has brought a few large dollar cases against solo 
physicians, which may have been intended as a warning but served mainly to 
heighten paranoia.  In the best known example, United States v. Krizek, the 
government spent six years (!) pursuing an aging psychiatrist for billing longer 
patient visits than actually had occurred,46 and sought civil penalties of roughly 
 
 43. See William M. Sage, Why Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malpractice Reform 
So (at All) Controversial?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 513 (2007). 
 44. For history and interpretation of the Medicare fraud control regime, see, for example, 
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life 
in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205 (1996); David A. Hyman, Health Care 
Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: 
A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239 (1999); 
William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 281 JAMA 1179 (1999). 
 45. See generally RONALD T. LIBBY, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEDICINE (2008) 
(discussing the impact of health care fraud laws on the physicians who are the target of the 
resulting investigations); David A. Hyman, Collateral Damage, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1476, 1476 
(2008) (book review) (describing the Libby book as “one-sided but deeply troubling,” and noting 
that “a study of physicians who had been convicted of Medicaid fraud found that not one of them 
believed they had done anything wrong”). 
 46. United States v. Krizek, 192 F. 3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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$81 million (!!).47  Krizek is paradigmatic of physicians’ reaction to fraud 
enforcement in part because the physician and his wife, who also did his 
billing (while his lawyer daughter represented them), were refugees from both 
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and during the very protracted course of the 
litigation came to regard the American government as but another totalitarian 
regime.48 
IV.  “THROUGH”: LAW AS POLITICS 
The last category of physician maladaptation to law consists of situations 
in which doctors come to regard law as overtly political, and therefore devoid 
of meaning apart from the politics by which it is determined.  Their response is 
to plow through the law, engaging the political process with brute force but 
little normative or factual argument.  Medical malpractice, while fiercely 
contested in the political arena, does not match this description because of its 
well-established empirics.  Better examples are Medicare payment 
negotiations, at the federal level, and scope of practice restrictions, at the state 
level. 
The political compromise with the American Medical Association that 
created Medicare in 1965 simultaneously renounced government control over 
medical practice and pledged reimbursement based on customary and 
prevailing physician charges.49  The inflationary perils of this structure were 
apparent by the early 1970s, and subsequent decades have been marked by a 
series of efforts to rein in spending by altering provider payment amounts 
rather than take on the more politically contentious issues of eligibility, 
benefits, delivery models, and means testing.  The first comprehensive reform 
of physician reimbursement, the Resource Based Relative Value Scale of the 
early 1990s, began as a consensus effort among professional leaders to redress 
a perceived imbalance between lavishly paid procedural subspecialties and 
under-rewarded “cognitive medicine” such as primary care.50  However, it 
 
 47. United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (“[I]n its claim for relief, the 
government asks for triple the alleged actual damages of $245,392 and civil penalties of $10,000 
for each of the 8,002 allegedly false reimbursement claims . . . .”), aff’d 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
 48. See Thomas L. Greaney & Joan H. Krause, United States v. Krizek: Rough Justice 
Under the Civil False Claims Act, in HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 187 
(Sandra Johnson et al. eds., 2009). 
 49. See DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES 27–39 (2006) (describing 
how Medicare begets avarice). 
 50. For a summary of the physician payment reform debate, see Alice G. Gosfield, Value 
Purchasing in Medicare Law: Precursor to Health Reform, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 169, 169, 173–
74 (1994). 
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soon deteriorated into internecine warfare, with various physician groups 
asserting rights to special formulas and supplemental payments.51 
Because of the aggregate fiscal implications of federal entitlement 
programs, these professional political contests eventually spilled onto the giant 
battlefield that constitutes budgetary politics in Washington, D.C.; first under 
the “paygo” (pay-as-you-go) rules for balancing revenues and expenditures, 
and then through establishment of a “sustainable growth rate” for physician 
payment.52  This latter process seems to have virtually no true legal content, 
instead resembling the medical budget-setting negotiations between 
government and organized medicine familiar in Canada and parts of Europe—
with the added contortion of Congress loudly legislating deep cuts in budgetary 
out-years to show its political courage and then quietly undoing them shortly 
before they would actually take effect. 
State health professional licensing laws and associated limitations on the 
scope of permissible practice display a similar realpolitik that renders actual 
law nearly invisible.  Unlike Medicare entitlement negotiations—which join 
physicians in pitched battles against other potential claimants of federal 
funds—scope of practice restrictions are determined not only by direct 
lobbying of state legislatures but also by procedural maneuvering among rival 
professional disciplinary boards (e.g., medicine, nursing, pharmacy, 
chiropractic, podiatry).  Physicians as a group engage both processes 
vigorously, with the result that surprisingly little liberalization of practice 
rights has occurred in the United States despite the creation of a large pool of 
“mid-level” providers whose competence has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
research studies.53 
In 1993, for example, a federal proposal to expand practice rights (and 
associated Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement) for advanced practice 
 
 51. See generally Timothy S. Jost, The Most Important Health Care Legislation of the 
Millennium (So Far): The Medicare Modernization Act, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
437, 439–40 (2005) (explaining congressional action to consistently increase payments under this 
formula in response to physician arguments). 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. 1395W-4(f) (2006) (sustainable growth rate for Medicare); Jost, supra 
note 51, at, 439–40 (explaining the sustainable growth rate); Tim Westmoreland, Standard 
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555 (2007) (discussing the 
relationship between federal fiscal policy such as paygo rules and substantive law, including 
health entitlements). 
 53. A review of eleven trials and twenty-three observational studies in primary care settings 
concluded that “[q]uality of care was in some ways better for nurse practitioner consultations.”  
Sue Horrocks et al., Systematic Review of Whether Nurse Practitioners Working in Primary Care 
Can Provide Equivalent Care to Doctors, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 819, 819 (2002); see also Linda H. 
Aiken, Achieving an Interdisciplinary Workforce in Health Care, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 164, 
165–66 (2003) (describing the quality of non-physician professionals); Mary O. Mundinger et al., 
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Trial, 283 JAMA 59, 59 (2000) (demonstrating equivalent outcomes). 
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nurses in connection with national health reform was countered immediately 
by an aggressive public relations campaign from the American Medical 
Association to mobilize physicians and frighten patients.54  The image used in 
the campaign—ducks wearing stethoscopes saying “quack, quack”—suggests 
that organized medicine had an antiquated understanding of the issues and was 
not truly prepared to debate public policy or law.  Only physicians who have 
been personally hauled before state disciplinary bodies seem to understand 
how important law is to professional licensing and practice restrictions, 
particularly in its commitment to due process.55 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH LAW 
Sometimes “the law is a ass,”56 and fighting or flouting it can be heroic.  In 
the United States, moreover, criticism of law extends both to outright 
government coercion and to fear of private litigation, which seems to replace 
personal discretion, expert judgment, and compassion with timidity, pedantry, 
and bureaucracy.57  The concerns physicians have with the law, as eloquently 
described by Professor Johnson,58 are real phenomena. 
My assessment of physicians’ protests diverges from Professor Johnson’s 
in its prescriptive dimension.  According to the medical journal editorial 
decrying government regulation with which this commentary began: 
“[P]hysicians want . . . oversight and open discussion . . . to occur among 
informed and knowledgeable people who are acting in the best interests of a 
specific patient.”59  Most physician complaints about law have to do with the 
first assertion, that government is inexpert in clinical matters.  I am more 
interested in the second assertion, that for medical law to be legitimate it must 
serve the interests of individual patients.  I believe that health law has been 
overly “medical,” meaning excessively concerned with protecting and 
 
 54. See generally THETIS M. GROUP & JOAN I. ROBERTS, NURSING, PHYSICIAN CONTROL 
AND THE MEDICAL MONOPOLY 417–18 (2001) (noting the opposing efforts of the American 
Nursing Association and the American Medical Association to respectively expand and contain 
the practice rights of advanced practice nurses); Barbara J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and 
Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice Nursing, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 417, passim 
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 55. See, e.g., Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (reversing as arbitrary a professional board’s decision to overrule its own hearing 
officer). 
 56. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 489 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford University Press 
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 57. See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE passim (Warner Books 
1996) (1994). 
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promoting physician-patient dynamics.60  For the next generation of health 
law, I believe the role of government should be to articulate society’s 
collective interest in a properly functioning health care system. 
American health care has serious systematic flaws.  We spend too much 
and receive too little.  People who could stay well get sick.  Many people who 
get sick have nowhere to go for care.  These are not just individual interests; 
they are collective ones.  If health reform depends on the specific interests of 
individual patients—which are inevitably defined by political anecdote as 
people who already suffer from life-threatening illness—I suspect we will 
never accomplish anything.  We will be asked, in slick advertisements by well-
funded special interests, whether we would want our sick parents, children, or 
spouses to be forced to navigate a hypothetical reformed system, as opposed to 
staying with “their doctor.”  Almost any proposed change to the existing 
system will seem too risky.  In my view, “good law” is not about informed and 
knowledgeable people acting in the interests of a specific patient.  It is about 
informed and knowledgeable people acting in the collective interest—in 
building a health care system that is compassionate, that is just, that is 
economically productive, and that doesn’t waste money that might be better 
spent elsewhere.  I hope that the physicians of the future will come to feel 
similarly. 
 
 60. See William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap 
Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497 (2008). 
